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CHAPTER 18 
Education Law 
§18.1. State aid to parochial schools. Few topics demand as much 
attention as the education of the young, and for this reason, ~ere is 
a growing concern for the future of private and parochial schools. 
The ·financial pinch of these institutions has become more critical 
as higher quality education is demanded of these schools, and as 
rapidly escalating operating costs make it virtually impossible for 
them to meet even existing standards. In Massachusetts, there can be 
no doubt as to the seriousness of the economic problem. Consideration 
must be given to this situation even if these schools continue to operate 
as they have been, which seems unlikely, or the state decides to take 
some aflirmative action as to their maintenance or their substitution. 
There were approximately 565 parochial schools in Massachusetts in 
1968, with an enrollment of nearly a quarter of a million pupils. If 
these schools were to be abandoned, the cost to the state just to replace 
those facilities unfit for continued use would be $1.2 billion. It would 
cost $212 million annually to educate the surplus of children that 
would enter the public school system. The tax rate in such towns as 
Fall River, Lowell and Lawrence would increase up to $44, while 
those in Boston, Worcester.and Holyoke would experience· at least a 
$25 rise.1 A plan to sustain these schools would no doubt be much 
less expensive. Connecticut, for example, has funded its program to 
pay a certain percentage of parochial school teachers salaries at only 
$6 million for the first year.1 The economic considerations are indeed 
formidable, and are without any question a major consideration of 
those intent upon providing some form of aid to Massachusetts paro-
chial schools. Many constituents are pressing their representatives for 
action on this problem. The General Court has already voted over-
whelmingly for a proposed amendment to the state constitution that 
would make grants to parochial schools permissible. A second vote is 
mandatory and is forthcoming in the 1970 session. Most believe that 
there will be no serious opposition to the proposal when this vote is 
taken.- However, the present crisis in education in Massachusetts has 
long-term implications as well as immediate economic consequences. 
How the legislature approaches this problem now will affect the direc-
tion Massachusetts will take in the field of education in the near and 
. 118.1. llle~ of the Maaachusetts Advilory Council on Education, in the 
Boston Herald Traveler, Sept. 12, 1969, at 48, col. 5. 
I Public Act 791, 126 (1969). i} 
_ Interview with George lloga'I (D-New Bedford), Howe chairman on education 
and member of a special legialadve c:ommigfon (1969 Sell.) to study the aid 
problem, Sept. 25, 1969. 
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distant future. It will similarly effect the state's relations with sectarian 
institutions in general. This comment will attempt to search the de-
velopment of church-state relations in Massachusetts and then pro-
ceed to analyze the legislature's several alternatives in the light of re-
cent pronouncements on the issue by the United States Supreme Court. 
As early as 1642 it was the legal duty of town selectmen in Massa-
chusetts to be sure that all children were" taught how to read. It was 
also the legal duty of the master of each family to hold catechism 
instructions for all children of the family. 1£ any child failed upon trial 
by the selectman to answer questions from the catechism, he could be 
taken from his parents and not returned until he reached the age 
of 21 years.' To be taught to read amounted to learning to read the 
catechism. By 1671 selectmen could not hire a schoolmaster who was 
not of sound religious standing in the community,1I and by 1701 a 
town could be fined for having a schoolmaster not approved by the 
local minister .• The learning process was thus intricately intertwined 
with the inculcation of theology, and the philosophy of liberty was 
infused with a sense of moral righteousness. 
The state Constitutional Convention of 1777-1778 produced a pro-
vision containing two articles that regulated church-state relations. 
One article declared that no one could be governor, lieutenant gov-
ernor, a member of the house or senate or a judge who was not a 
Protestant. The other article stated that free exercise of religion was 
to be enjoyed by all Protestant denomin~tions.T There was no men-
tion of schools or education. This constitution was soundly defeated 
in the popular election of 1778. A year later another convention met. 
The constitution it proposed contained an article that sustained the 
interrelation of secular and religious institutions, affirming the state's 
right to require towns to provide religious instruction. It also pro-
vided that religious societies in lieu of the town officials could have 
"the exclusive right of electing their public teachers." The last para-
graph of Article III provided for equal protection of all denomina-
tions of Christians.8 The proposal also contained a subsection entitled 
The Encouragement of Literature, which declared, "[it is the duty of 
the legislature]" to encourage private societies and public institutions, 
reward and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, 
commerce ..•. "8 Thus, secular instruction was perforce complimented 
by the infusion of religious principles in all education in Massa-
chusetts for over a century. 
By 1820, religious affiliations in the Commonwealth had grown 
more diverse. Several amendments to the Constitution were offered 
• The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony, Chapter on 
Children and Youth (1642). 
II Id., Chapter on Schools (1671) • 
• Province Laws, 1701-1702. c. 10, §2 (1701). 
T Rejected Mass. Const. of 1778. arts. XXIX, XXXIV. 
8 Mass. Const. of 1779, Part the First, art. In. 
8 Id., Part the Second, Co 5, §2. 
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at that year's constitutional convention, one of which sought to do 
away with that part of the third article that made it incumbent upon 
the state to provide places for worship and for religious instruction. 
This responsibility was to be vested in the individual sects, and mem-
bers would contribute to support only their own denomination's in-
struction. The amendment also sought to do away with the relatively 
anachronistic rule of compulsory attendance at church and religious 
instruction. It failed to pass by a two-to-one margin in the popular 
vote. However, by 1833 an amendment was adopted and ratified, ac· 
complishing what the proposal of the 1820 convention had failed to. 
The Eleventh Amendment also declared that all religious sects and 
denominations were to be treated equally and none were to be subordi-
nate to another. The great control that the state had maintained over 
religious affairs was thus extinguished. The greater variety of sects 
and denominations and the ever-increasing number of members in 
each required that this control be abandoned in favor of self·determi-
nation. Yet the emphasis on religious instruction and morality re-
mained, as the opening clause of the amended third article attests: 
As the public worship of God and instructions in piety, religion 
and morality, promote the happiness and prosperity of a people 
and the security of a republican government .... 10 
In 1835 a system of common schools was established in Chapter 23 
of the Revised Statutes. Towns were to levy taxes, appoint instructors 
and determine the structure of their own school district. A state school 
fund had also been created from the sale of land in Maine and from 
the federal money received for services of the Massachusetts' militia. 
One section of Chapter 23 provided that no books could be used in 
the common schools that promoted the tepets of any particular de-
nomination of Christians.11 Thus, in a matter of a few years, the 
state went from the avid promoter of morality to the stern advocate 
of a secular school system. Yet in 1846 the school fund was expanded,12 
and in 1847 Amherst and Harvard were granted annuities.13 Thus, 
the state had not entirely turned its face from religious affiliated educa-
tional institutions. 
In 1853 another constitutional convention assembled and the com-
missioner on education and literature was ordered to inquire into a 
possible amendment prohibiting sectarian appropriat~ons. This re-
sulted in adoption of the state's first anti-aid amendment. As the 
commissioner proposed various drafts, problems arose in relation to 
the meaning of the word "schools." The initial response to this query 
was that it did not embrace colleges, but only schools at the town 
10 Id., art. III. 
11 Revised Statutes of 18S5; c. 11, §IS; c. 2S, §2S. 
12 M.G.L. 1846, c. 219. 
18 Bulletins for the Constitutional Convention, 1917·1918, Vol. II, at 56 (herein. 
after cited as Bulletins). 
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level.14 Samuel K. Lothrop of Boston, a prime force in support of the 
measure, declared that: 
. . . This resolution relates simply to the common schools of 
the Commonwealth ... we wish to provide against any sectarian 
or denominational influence being brought to bear in their man-
agement. That covers the whole extent of the resolution.111 
This idea seems to be the genuine basis of the amendment, and it is 
reiterated at several points in the debates by key personnel in the 
amendment's adoption.18 Samuel Parker of Cambridge introduced the 
resolution that eventually would be passed and ratified. A "thin 
House" accepted the submitted proposal, but this did not end the 
debate. Some felt the resolution .was not sufficiently inclusive, and 
Parker, a Harvard professor, was accused of lobbying for that institu-
tion's interests. Parker reasserted what he considered the main purpose 
of the measure, i.e., the safeguarding of the common school system 
from eventual envelopment by the sectarian schools, which he thought 
were about to press the state for financial aid. M\!.ch of the general 
dissatisfaction came from those delegates who felt the amendment was 
simply unnecessary. There had been no indications of future problems 
regarding the common schools, nor .any request for aid from the 
private schools. The trouble, they felt, would result from the con-
troversy over the proposed amendment. The convention was causing 
a problem that they ostensibly were attempting to solve,1'1 Neverthe-
less, in November 1853, Proposition 6 was submitted to the people for 
ratification. It provided: 
All monies raised by taxation in the towns and cities, for the 
support of public schools, and all monies which may be appro-
priated for the support of the common schools shall be applied 
to and expended in no other schools, other than those which 
are conducted according to the law, under the order and super-
intendence of the authorities of the town or city in which the 
money is to be expended; and such monies shall never be ap-
propriated to any religious sect, for the maintenance, exclusively, 
of its own schools. 
The proposal was defeated at the polls by 411 votes out of a total of 
more than 130,000 cast. In a special election two years later, however, 
the resolution of the Massachusetts Convention was ratified and be-
came the Eighteenth Amendment. 
In 1866 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the 
amendment in accordance with its promoters' intentions. The case, 
14 Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention of 
1855 at 485. 
111 Id. at 545. 
18Id. at 547; vol. III, at 618. 
1'1 Id. at 545; vol. III, at 618-619. 
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Merrick v. Inhabitants of Amherst,18 involved a suit by taxpaying 
townspeople to enjoin the town from issuing bonds or borrowing 
money for a privately operated agricultural college. The issue, inter 
alia, was whether this action was in violation of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. The Court had little difficulty dispelling the petitioner's 
contention: 
The object of the provision is to regulate the expenditure of 
money . . . for general educational purposes, and to confine it 
strictly to the support of the common or public schools . . . the 
phrases "public schools" and "common schools" . . . are never 
applied to ... incorporated academies and colleges.1V 
Colleges were hence judicially excluded from the amendment's pro~ 
hibitive force. The Court went ort to say that the amendment was 
also intended to disallow appropriations for schools of a "sectarian 
character." It is notable that the Court mentions this as a secondary 
purpose of the provision. 
Sectarian aid was outlawed to achieve the fundamental aim of the 
amendment, the preservation the common school system, but by the 
tum of the century state aid to sectarian schools was looked upon as 
an evil in and of itself, without regard to this initial objective. 
In 19U the Massachusetts House and Senate requested the Su-
preme Judicial Court to give an advisory opinion on whether the 
existing constitutional provisions adequately prohibited sectarian ap-
propriations in any form, and whether the Court felt it necessary to 
further amend the constitution to so provide. The Court said that al-
though aid was forbidden to sectarian primary and secondary schools, 
it was not prohibited to schools at the college level. With Chief 
Justice Rugg apparently not willing to cast a decisive vote, the Court 
divided evenly on the question of aid to church-related institutions 
serving other than educational purposes. It declined to express its 
opinion as to whether an amendment was necessary, dt:eming this an 
exclusively legislative conc(!rn.20 The Court's division on this charitable 
institution question, as well as its response regarding aid to college-
level institutions, was sufficient to prod the legislature to consider a 
more extensive amendment in the area of public aid to private institu-
tions. Of course, since the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution was not then considered to make the First Amendment 
applicable to the states, the issues of contravention of the federal 
constitution was not before the Court. 
~ anti-aid measure had been before the Massachus(!tts' legislature 
14 of the 16 years between 1900 and 1916. It was one of the main rea-
sons for holding the Constitutional Convention in 1917. The fact that 
this convention was held at all was the subject of much disillusion-
18 94 Mass. 500 (1866). 
18Id. at 508-509. 
20 Opinion of the Justices, 214 Mus. 599, 601-602, 102 N.E. 464 (1918). 
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ment at the time, and the numerous forces that brought it into being 
are by their nature and complexity beyond the scope of this discus-
sion. These forces were primarily of a political character, political 
not wholly in the sense of a movement among the body politique, but 
rather in the sense of a combination of party profiteering and personal 
ambition.21 There were important issues to be considered, but the 
idea of a Constitutional Convention to settle them did not appeal to 
a majority of the voters.22 Nevertheless, the convention convened and 
its first serious debate centered around an anti-sectarian, or anti-aid 
amendment. What resulted from this debate was the replacement of 
the Eighteenth Amendment by the Forty-sixth Amendment, popularly 
known as the Curtis-Lomasney Amendment. Edwin U. Curtis of Bos-
ton, speaking for his proposal, declared that if the framers of the 
Eighteenth Amendment could have known how much money woUld 
be spent on private institutions subsequent to 1853, they would have 
seen to it that no sectarian institution in the state would have been 
eligible for aid.28 Actually, of the nearly $7 million that the state 
paid to educational and charitable institutions from 1860-1899, 
Catholic charities received $49,000 and Catholic educational facilities 
received nothing.24 From 1899 through 1916, even the charities were 
ignored. During these 56 years, the largest private appropriations went 
to such charitable institutions as the Perkins Institute for the Blind, 
the Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary and the Massachusetts Sol-
diers' Home. The educational institutions receiving aid included 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Tufts University, Williams 
College, Amherst College, Wesleyan Academy and Mount Holyoke 
College, all privately operated,211 with several engaged in the training 
of sectarian ministers. 
Bishop Frederick L. Anderson of the Newton Theological School 
told the delegates that 100,000 members of various "patriotic orders" 
supported the amendment.28 It would, he said, finish the job that was 
started in 1853.21 He himself desired a stronger amendment than was 
initially proposed but his faction accepted the Curtis-Lomasney prop-
osition, albeit with some reluctance. Anderson seems to have been at 
least genuinely motivated by a constitutional concept and appears to 
21 For an interesting. brief, though somewhat opinionated account of the events 
leading up to the Constitutional Convention of 1917. see R. L. Bridgman, The 
Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917 (1923). 
22Id. at 9. 
28 Debates in the Constitutional Convention. 1917-1918, vol. I. at 67-68. 
241d. at 176. See also the tables set forth in Bulletins at 60-79. 
211 Bulletins at 60-77. 
28 R. L. Bridgman. The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917. at 
19 (192!1). Among these were the American Minute Men. reputed to be an offshoot 
of the American Protective Association. Their leader was one Frank Batcheller. 
who was the man behind the antisectarian amendments proposed to the General 
Court each year from 1900 through 1916. 
21 Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention of 
1855. at 77. 
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have been the only one of the several primary supporters of the 
amendment so inclined. Doctrinaire as he was, his purpose, unlike 
that of many of his colleagues, was not substantially political. 
Directly opposing the views of Professor Anderson was John W. 
Cummings. He felt that the Eighteenth Amendment had discriminated 
against Catholics and that sectarian schools ought to be incorporated 
into the common school system as a matter of right to those who chose 
to attend them. (This argument is commanding considerable attention 
today, as will be illustrated below.) Cummings declared that the paro-
chial schools had not asked the government for any money what-
soever, and that he could only deduce from this that fear and mistrust, 
chiefly the result of the actions of "patriotic orders," were responsible 
for the clamor over this issue.28 Echoing the prophecy of the dissenters 
at the 1853 convention, he asserted that only further divisiveness and 
hatred would result from unnecessary action. Following Cummings 
were those who felt the proposal far too inclusive, as it made all 
private institutions~ charitable as well as educational, ineligible for 
state aid. Men who, for various reasons, desired an anti-sectarian 
amendment were against what they considered the proposal's unneces-
sary overbreadth. However, in their zeal to see the sectarian matter 
settled "once and for all," a broader amendment, including private 
educational and charitable institutions, was accepted.29 1£ this addi-
tional prohibition had not been added, they were warned, they would 
have to face accusations of bigotry on the school issue_ 
Among those concerned over the amendment's overbreadth were 
several who wished MIT and Worcester Polytechnic Institute to con-
tinue receiving annual stipends promised by the statc~ several years 
prior to the convention. After protracted discussion on the topic, 
these fears were quieted to a degree by Lomasney's declaration that 
the state's arrangements with these schools were untouched by the 
amendment because of the federal constitution's bar against a state 
passing any "law impairing the obligations of contracts."SO Finally, 
the convention adopted a resolution inserting into the amendment 
the right of the state '~to carry out legal obligations, il£ any, already 
entered into." This kept the annuities safe for five yea:rs at least, but 
more importantly ended an increasingly troublesome debate that 
could have proven disastrous to the Curtis-Lomasney measure. Hence, 
though there were many who for various reasons objected to the 
amendment's sweeping provisions, the poignancy of concern over the 
private school issue propelled the amendment to acceptance. 
The Forty-sixth Amendment was a product of both religious bigotry 
and sincere belief in the absolute separation of church and state. But 
it seems that these facton were secondary to a larger force that these 
causes themselves produced. This was the general attitude of the 
28Id. at 211. 
29 Id. at 98-101, 153-154. 
so Id. at IlII. 
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populace - one that was generated by mistrust and misunderstand-
ing and apparently groundless in fact - that "something must be 
done before it's too late." This mood was probably created by bigots 
and absolutists, but it engulfed its creators as it became a tide of 
popular feeling generating rumor and fear. Nevertheless, it was a 
"movement" of sorts, gathering momentum, however artifically, and 
reaching fruition in the ratification of the Forty-sixth Amendment. 
Several opinions offered during the debate further demonstrate the 
unmanageability of the issue at the convention. Attorney John Pel-
letier was one of the foremost Catholic proponents of the amendment. 
He expressed his feeling that the best work of the state had been 
done under the impulse of religion, and that the foundation of this 
society was upon religious principles. Irreligion was the thing to be 
feared, he said, and fortunately, it was being combatted in the col-
leges and academies of the Commonwealth. Despite these convictions 
and the lack of factual data to support the fear of religious infiltration 
into the state treasury, Pelletier still felt that society had grown too 
"cosmopolitan" and public opinion too strong to further allow any 
state aid to private institutions.31 Roland Sawyer felt that the election 
of the first Catholic governor in 1913 had frightened many people 
into believing a papist conspiracy existed. He also compared the 
movement's secretiveness to that of the Know-Nothing Party of 1853.32 
Another delegate queried as to how the school question even got be-
fore the committee on the Bill of Rights instead of before the educa-
tion committee, and said he could only deduce from this that the 
convention just did not know what it was doing.3s Another stated 
that two-thirds of the amendment was "clap-trap" and accused the 
ambitious Curtis and Lomasney of being behind the whole scheme.s4 
There were numerous other expressions of the doubt and confusion 
that characterized the debates. In the end, however, it was the unshak-
able conviction of Professor Anderson and his faction, the political 
and personal power of, Martin Lomasney,SIi and the constant emphasis 
on the manifest desires of the people that combined to give the 
amendment its broad appeal. 
An epilogue to the convention's acceptance vote is a final demonstra-
tion as to the prevalent misunderstanding of the exact scope of the 
resolution. Nearly a month after the convention voted to submit the 
amendment to the people, the committee on education reported out 
an amendment that would have given the legislature power to act in 
contravention of the provisions of the anti-aid amendment. It pro-
vided that: 
31 Id. at 97-98. 
S2Id. at 185-184. 
83Id. at 110-111. 
Uld. at 115. 
811 Lomasney has been described as "conspicuously the most intense personal 
force in the convention." R. L. Bridgman, The Massachusetts Constitutional Con· 
vention of 1917, at 156 (1925). 
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[T]he Legislature shall have the power by taxation or other· 
wise as will ... insure a complete and efficient system of educa· 
tion, which will afford to everyone an opportunity for full men· 
tal, physical, and moral development.8f~ 
Curtis protested the amendment in behalf of his committee as directly 
in conflict with their resolution. The education committee, after with· 
drawing its proposal, resubmitted it for debate, claiming that their 
measure had been reported before the anti·aid amendment. Strong 
sentiment was expressed for giving to the legislature the power to 
direct the educational policy of the state, bringing about a more 
flexible approach to education than would result from the anti·aid 
amendment. The issue of tax exemption benefits for religious insti· 
tutions was then interjected by Professor Anderson, who substituted 
it for the broad grant of power in the initial education amendment. 
This further confused matters. Anderson's proposal was attacked as 
unnecessary and unwise legislative policy by a former judge of the 
Supreme Judicial Court,87 and that was sufficient to convince a 
majority that such an amendment was unwarranted. In June 1918, 
a proposal similar to the initial education committee: measure was 
introduced but withdrawn two days later with no debate. The anti· 
aid amendment had already been ratified in November 1917 by a 
large majority of voters.88 The convention itself had refused to 
recommend the amendment's passage, trusting the elc!ctoral process 
to pronounce fair judgment. Amidst accusations and cross·accusations, 
political and religious ~hortations,89 the Forty.sixth Amendment 
replaced the Eighteenth Amendment in the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth. 
The forces that had.moved the delegates to approve such a sweep-
ing measure amid apprehension and confusion effectively moved the 
populace as well. This is not to negate the genuine expression of 
the will of the voters on this issue. It is submitted, however, that the 
collective will of the people, like that of the convention, was subject 
to misleading calculations and resulting prejudices that were more 
responsible for the ratification than any degree of thoughtful de· 
liberation and enlightening discussion that so important and complex 
an issue warranted. Perhaps it is in the nature of constitutional 
conventions that they are subject to the prevailing moods of the 
moment. That these moods prevent crucial issues from being con· 
sidered with the deliberation and detachment that they require is 
most unfortunate. 
88 Debates in the Constitutional Convention, 1917-1918, vol. I, at 288. 
87 Id. at lI60-lI61. 
88 R. L. Bridgman, The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1917, at 
40 (192l1). The total vote at the election was lI94,070. Fifty-two percent of those 
who went to the polls were for the amendment; lIlI percent were opposed to it. 
The remaining voters left the ballot blank (over 57,000). 
89 Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1917, at 17·18; Id., Nov. 5, 1917, at 1. 
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A judgment on such a crucial issue that results from the topical 
pressures of an era is inevitably challenged by another era, forced to 
examine that judgment because of its evaluation of the issue. Mas-
sachusetts has never ceased considering the issue of public aid to 
private schools and it now finds itself grappling with the prohibitions 
of the anti-aid amendment. A bill to amend the Eighteenth Amend-
ment has already passed the General Court on the first reading.4o 
This, along with a bill providing for a special commission to study 
all aspects of the issue indicates a definite trend toward establishing 
aid programs to private schools. Several of the objects of the com-
mission's study have already been looked into by the Advisory Council 
on Education and point to the same conclusion. These include the 
degree of need of such aid by nonpublic schools, the effect on the 
local tax rates were these schools to cease operating, and the tax 
increase in the event such aid is granted. Most of the commission's 
work will be in fact and figure gathering, as economics is unquestion-
ably the primary force behind the move for aid. Yet there are less 
calculable but perhaps more critical issues that the commission, the 
legislature, and the people must consider. These are "the implications 
of certain provisions of the federal constitution and the constitution of 
the Commonwealth."41 
As it now reads, the Eighteenth Amendment of the Massachusetts 
Constitution forbids any kind of direct aid and probably most forms 
of indirect aid. The bill to amend this provision, which seems rel-
atively certain of passage in its second vote, contains sweeping pro-
visions for the allowance of aid which are analogous in scope, but 
contrary in nature, to those of the Eighteenth Amendment. There 
are just two sentences, one prohibiting the use of public money for 
any institution "which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive 
control" of the Commonwealth or federal authority. The second 
sentence allows the legislature to make "grants-in-aid" to private 
educational institutions in such manner as may be provided by the 
general court. Such a broad grant of power would seem to be in 
direct conflict with the prohibitions of the first sentence. In taking 
this critical step, the legislature is apparently desirous of retaining 
as much as possible the ideal of separation of church and state, but 
at the same time trying to meet an economic crisis in its educational 
system. As far as the literal form of its constitutional provisions are 
concerned, in desiring to do both things, it may find that it has 
done neither very well; yet as we have seen this conflict of competing 
interests is as old as the first Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. 
Topical crises have, fortunately or unfortunately, altered its funda-
mental law on this issue several times. Massachusetts must again 
choose a direction and all indications are that it will reverse the 
40 House Bill 1087. See Appendix 1 infra. 
41 House Bill. 4980. See Appendix 2 infra. This bill i. a conglomeration of a 
number of bills introduced to deal with the aid issue. 
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direction chosen 50 years ago by the 1917 convention. However, it 
has the advantage now of having the past to examine, of benefitting 
from the realization that the extremes of outright subsidization and 
absolute alienation have proven unacceptable. Massachusetts' past 
experience with the issue ought to at least generate an understanding 
of its complexity and of the importance of looking beyond the 
moment's crisis. 
The legislature must also consider the implication:s of the First 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.42 The interpretation of 
this amendment is also in a state of uncertainty. An understanding 
of the Supreme Court's present position and of its possible future 
movements in the area requires a sketch of the evolution of its 
present policy. It must also be realized that its position could either 
be extended in scope or severely constricted in suits challenging state 
programs similar to those Massachusetts is now contemplating. 
In 1924, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters4S recog-
nized the right of parents to direct the education of their children.· 
1£ this choice meant that the children were to be sent to sectarian 
institutions, the state could not deny that freedom of c:hoice without 
violating the liberty guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
thrust of the case was that parochial schools were given the right to 
exist in order to sustain to a class of people their freedom of choice 
in matters relating to the education of their children. The case takes 
on additional relevance in the light of the increasing demand for 
community control of schools. Sectarian schools will probably have 
a significant role to play in that controversy regardless of whether or 
not they receive aid. However, if they do receive aid" the question 
of how much control the state or local community can thus exercise 
over their policies will be far more poignant. The implications of 
such developments are far-ranging and beyond the scope of this 
discussion. One final observation seems appropriate. 'While the Su-
preme Court's most recent decision in this area was being considered 
in the New York Court of Appeals, that court declared that providing 
textbooks to school children who attended private schools was con-
stitutionally permissible. Judge Van Voorhis dissentt:d, basing his 
opinion on the interesting observation that this program was a step 
toward state domination of sectarian education.44 The judge felt 
that religion must fear the state's intrusion more than the state 
ought to fear that of the church. 
In 1929 the Supreme Court, in Cochran v.Board of Education,4IS 
affirmed a Louisiana Supreme Court decision that denied injunctive 
relief sought by the complaint to restrain a local school board from 
appropriating funds to purchase books for private schoolchildren. No 
42 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 
48268 U.S. 510 (1924) . 
.. Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 128, 228 N.E.2d 791, 798 (1968). 
411 281 U.S. 870 (1929). . 
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First Amendment issue was raised, presumably because its applica-
bility to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment has not yet been 
fully recognized. The appellants did claim that the appropriations 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against taking pri-
vate property for a private purpose. The court accepted the Louisiana 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the law as benefitting only the 
children and the state, and as aiding no sectarian purpose since the 
books were lent to the children and were the same as those used in 
the public schools. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, 
declared that the statute served strictly a public purpose in its con-
cern for the education of all the children of the state. 
By 1940 it was made clear that the First Amendment was applicable 
to the states through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 
Six years later the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Everson v. Board of Education.47 The court held that a New Jersey 
statute allowing for local authorization of reimbursement for trans-
portation expenses incurred by parents of parochial schoolchildren 
did not violate the First Amendment. The Court split five to four, 
with strong dissenting opinions written by Justices Jackson and 
Rutledge. Justice Black, writing for the. majority, declared that just 
because a state law that is passed primarily to satisfy a public need 
incidentally is helpful to those private persons most directly affected, 
the law is not necessarily objectionable.48 However, a substantial 
portion of his argument focuses on the free exercise clause. Justice 
Black says that it is the duty of the state to secure the welfare of the 
public, and if it chooses to provide bus transportation for public 
schoolchildren, " ... it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans 
... or members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of 
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."4D This 
may be considered as either indirectly subordinating the establishment 
clause to the free exercise clause, or reading the First Amendment as 
a whole and applying the general welfare test to a broad theory of 
church-state relations. Finally, Justice Black declared, "State power 
is no more to be used so as to handicap religions that it is to favor 
them."lio This could mean that whatever the state does for its public 
schools, it must also do for the sectarian schools, since in not doing it 
for the latter the state would handicap a religion and also those who 
chose to attend its schools. This argument is being advanced with 
much vigor today in relation to current controversy over extensive 
aid programs. 
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson, pointed out that only Cath-
olic parents were reimbursed and not parents of other private school 
children, or parents of children who attended schools of another 
46 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 1110 U.S. 296, 303 (1939). 
47 SSO U.S. 1 (1946). 
48Id. at 6. 
4DId. at 16. 
GO Id. at 18. 
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sect. Reading the facts somewhat differently than the majority, Jack-
son asserted that since. the buses were supplied not by the state but 
by a commercial organization, the reimbursement was a direct subsidy 
to the Catholic parents with tax money from the entire community. 
This constituted a direct preference of one religion over· another 
and was hence indistinguishable from aiding the church itself. 111 
Justice Rutledge, although he admitted that he could have based 
his dissent on narrower grounds, attacked the statute on the broad 
principles of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Re-
ligious Assessments." He asserted that the majority decision disre-
garded Madison's warning about becoming bound by dangerous, 
corrosive precedents on this subject.1I2 Rutledge dismissed the public 
purpose argument as disguising the religious factor and as basically 
avoiding the issue.1IS He sympathized with those who had chosen to 
bear the double burden of supporting both schools, but felt it to be 
a necessary price for religious freedom.1I4 Rutledge's logic is sound and 
he reveals many of the loose ends of the majority opinion. Neverthe-
less, his argument is based on a premise of strict construction that 
would seem to necessarily demand· a withdrawal of all and any recog-
nition the state gives to religion, including tax benefits and other 
forms of indirect aid to sectarian charitable institutions. This thesis 
is not without its adherents today, but it is losing stature as both 
state and federal governments extend their activities into areas hereto-
fore exclusively of private concern. This trend is makin~~ accommoda-
tion of religious matters a practical necessity.1I11 
The Everson case was the court's most important venture into the 
area of state aid to private schools and has been the basis for argu-
ments both supporting and opposing other aid programs. Continual 
reference has subsequently been made to Justice Black's dictum: 
. . • no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied. to 
support any religious activities or institutions, whatevc!r they may 
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion.1I8 
Justice Black felt, however, that the free exercise clause superseded 
any objections to whatever tax money was expended to pay the cost 
of busing Catholic schoolchildren. Justice Jackson felt that the ma-
jority betrayed this very dictum in ignoring the establishment issue 
111 Id. at 18-24. 
112Id. at 57-58. 
lIS Id. at 50. 
114 Id. at 58. 
1111 For example, Sherbert v. Verner, S74 U.s. S98 (1962), held that a state could 
not deny employment compensation benefits to a citizen who refused a job be-
cause it involved working on Saturday, which his religion prohibited. 
118 Everson V. Board of Education, SSO u.s. 1. 16 (1946). 
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in its holding. IT This troublesome but persistent divergence in empha-
sis on the two clauses of the First.Amendment manifests itself through-
out the next 20 years in decisions concerning church-state relations. 
One year after Everson the Court decided McCollum v. Board of 
Education.1IS Speaking again through Justice Black, the Court inval-
idated an Illinois "released time" program. The plan provided for 
religious instructors, paid by religious groups and approved by the 
school superintendent, to come into the public schools one day a 
week to instt:uct children whose parents had requested the instruction. 
Students not attending the instruction had to remain on the premises 
and pursue other school-related duties. The majority cited the use 
of tax-supported school buildings and the close association of the 
school authorities with religious groups as objectionable as both an 
establishment of religion and an inhibition of the free exercise of 
religion for those who did not attend the instruction.1I9 Justice Black 
did not distinguish Everson with regard to particulars but settled for 
a broad reference to that case's dicta, including the statement quoted 
in the preceding paragraph. Justice Reed, dissenting, felt that there 
was no establislu:nent of religion here since all classes of believers 
and nonbelievers could participate with no restraint on free exercise 
since there was no evidence of coercion. 
In 1951 the Court decided Zorach v. Clauson,8o which involved 
another "released time" program. However, here the court upheld 
in a 6 to S vote a New York statute pennitting public schools to 
release children during regular class hours to go off the school grounds 
for religious activity. Students not so released remained in the class-
room. Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, cited the fact that 
no use of public property was involved as it had been in McCollum, 
nor was there any form of coercion on students to attend the reli~ous 
classes; To invalidate this program, he declared, would be too extreme 
an application of the First Amendment and repugnant to the govern-
ment's accommodating relations with all religions.81 Black dissented, 
referring again to the use of the state's machinery and its cooperation 
with religion as bringing the program within the strictures of the 
First Amendment. 
These two cases, when read together, indicate a tendency by the 
Court to scrutinize individual fact situations and the question of 
the degree of interrelationship between church and state officials in 
each situation. A decisional case by case process has thus evolved as 
the court confronts varying fact patterns, each with its own degree of 
state involvement in religious affairs, or vice versa. The court has 
been involved in a process which is the ineluctable result of consider-
IITId. at 19. 
118 555 u.s. 205 (1948). 
119 Id. at 209·212. 
80 545 u.s. 506 (1952). 
81Id. at 515. 
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ing degree an essential guideline. Justice Douglas' acknowledgement 
of this "degree" in Zorach62 is a statement of the problem as well as 
an answer to the dissent's inflexible position on the issue. 
In 1961, in Engel v. Vi·tale,68 the court held unconstitutional by a 
vote of six to one a state school board's directive that an official 
prayer be recited at the start of the school day. The prayer was of 
non-denominational nature, and those who did not wish to join in 
the prayer could remain silent. The Court, speaking through Justice 
Black, who did not cite a single case in the opinion, declared that 
the First Amendment prohibited government from composing prayers 
to be read in its schools by direction of a state school board. The use 
of government facilities and prestige to support religion, he said, 
indirectly exerts coercion upon those present to conform to the estab-
lished practice. Black also reverted to the relationship argument of 
his dissent in Zorach and his holding in McCollum. The purpose of 
the First Amendment, he said, is to prevent any "union" of church 
and state.64 By such "union" Black apparently means any interrela-
tionship that gives recognition to any form of religion. 
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, stated that the majority had repu-
diated a heritage and misapplied a constitutional principle.61S 
The Court handed down A bington School District v. Schempp66 a 
year later. This case invalidated state laws that required passages of 
the Bible to be read and the Lord's Prayer to be recited at the start 
of the school day. Students could refrain with the written permission 
of their parents. Justice Clark, who wrote the majority opinion, de-
veloped further the "primary purpose and effect" test that had 
sprouted its roots in Cochran in 1929. This test had been relied upon 
heavily in McGowan v. Maryland,ST where the Court upheld a state's 
Sunday closing laws because the statute's present purpose and effect 
was not to aid religion but to set aside "a day of rest and recreation."68 
In Schempp, Justice Clark stated that if either the primary purpose 
or effect were "the advancement or inhibition of religion" then the 
law would be unconstitutional.e9 The primary purpose of the prac-
tice here was to require a religious exercise in public schools, and the 
Court considered this an "advancement of religion." 
Again, Justice Stewart was the lone dissenter. He would have re-
manded for findings of proof as to the existence or nonexistence of 
a coercive force operating on those children who did not wish to 
participate.To Justice Stewart's dissent emphasized an argument men-
62Id. at 1114 • 
. 68 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
fJ4 Id. at 431. 
61S Id. at 444-450. 
66374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
6T 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
68Id. at 449. 
69 S74 U.S. at 222. 
TO Id. at 320. 
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tioned earlier in regard to Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson. 
The occasion was Justice Black's remark that "[s]tate power is no 
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."71 
Reference to this argument was also made in Zorach by Justice 
Douglas: 
... But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it 
necessary for the government to be hostile to religion and to 
throw its weight against efforts to widen the scope of religious 
inHuence.72 
Justice Stewart expands on this concept in pointing to the free 
exercise issue that he felt had been ignored by the Court in Schempp. 
His view on "the establishment of a religion of secularism" is worth 
summarizing at length from his opinion: 
... For a compulsory state educational system so structures a 
child's life that if religious exercises are held be an impermissible 
activity in schools, religion is placed at an artifical and state-
created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such 
exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are 
truly to be neutral in the matter of religion. And a refusal to 
permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as the realization of 
state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of 
secularism, or at the least, as government support of the beliefs 
of those who think that religious exercises should be conducted 
only in private.7S 
The argument has also been applied to meet the constitutional ob· 
jections to school aid programs. It is contended that, as the financial 
burdens of sectarian schools grow totally overbearing, it will be the 
state's duty to provide the aid necessary to preserve the free exercise 
rights of those who wish to attend the schools. At the same time, if 
the state refuses, it will be fostering a "religion of secularism." 
This relatively innovative view of "neutrality" is being advocated 
by several commentators on the issue, including Wilbur G. Katz, who 
in 1963 stated that as government activity increased, strict separation 
of church and state would severely limit religious freedom. Katz 
feels that government aid may be the only way to maintain a true 
position of neutrality.74 This neutrality would permit and perhaps 
require including religious schools in school funding programs. These 
sectarian schools could not be aided singularly, Katz asserts, but 
rather in statewide programs which would be unobjectionable al-
though it could result in indirect aid to religious teaching.711 Although 
71 !J!JO u.s. at 18. 
72 !J4!J U.s. at !J14. 
7S 1I74 U.S. at 1I111. 
74 W. Katz, Religion and American Constitutions 27 (196!l). 
711 Id. at 74. 
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Katz deems "groundless" the notion that aid to public schools· alone 
could be constitutionally objectionable as a prohibition of the free 
exercise clause, this is the logical extension of his viewpoint on 
the aid issue. This latter argument is enthusiastically embraced by 
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., dean of Boston College Law School. He has 
applied this interpretation to a criticism of the decision in Horace 
Mann League v. Board of Public Works of Md.16 There, the Maryland 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional three of four state matching 
grants to private colleges for the construction of nonsectarian facilities. 
The court, after conceding the "primary purpose" of the grants . to 
be secular, nevertheless held the grants invalid because the "operative 
effect" was said to aid religion. Dean Drinan notes a logical inconsis-
tency here and queries as to how such a grant, deemed secular and 
as serving a public purpose, could h,ave a primary effect that advanced 
religion? His notion of neutrality requires that the state, in awarding 
appropriations in pursuit of a public purpose, avoid inquiry into 
one's religious or irreligious background. This idea is a corollary 
of his main thesis, that a state violates both clauses of the First Amend-
ment if it denies aid designated to achieve a public purpose to an 
institution that is church-related solely on the ground that is sectarian. 
It violates the free exercise clause because it inhibits an individual's 
right to choose the type of education he desires by denying to him 
benefits he would otherwise obtain had he not exercised that freedom. 
It violates the establishment clause in sponsoring the inculcation of 
secularism and basing appropriations on its determination that this 
approach to religion in education is the only one deserving of aid. 
As the only workable norm, Dean Drinan would qualify the estab-
lishment clause by making any sponsorship of secular values yield to 
a claim of free exercise of religion.1T Practically speaking, this means 
that a state cannot deny a student aid because he exercised this 
freedom and did not attend the secularist institution that the state 
supports. If the state wishes to aid secularism, it must guarantee this 
student's right to choose a sectarian school. Yet, since any state aid 
must in general be for a public purpose, if secularism is to be treated 
as a form of religion, then the state could not constitutionally aid 
public schools since that would be fostering the religion of secularism. 
To be sure, this is carrying Dean Drinan's argument ad absurdum, 
_ and perhaps denying its essential merit, i.e., its emphasis on the free 
exercise clause. It seems, however, that any attempt to establish a 
principle by which states can steer a straight course of constitutional 
accommodation between the competing interests involved must meet 
with a similar end when extended to its logical extreme. The resultant 
inflexibility leaves one where he started, with restrictive language to 
interpret in a multitude of fact situations. 
76242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.s. 97 (1966). 
77 Drinan, Does State Aid to Church-Related Colleges Constitute An Establish-
ment of Religion? - Reflections on the Maryland College Cases, 1967 Utah 1... Rev. 
491, 509-516. 
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The thesis of Philip Kurland is diametrically opposed to that of 
Dean Drinan. He postulates that government can not use religion as 
a standard for positive or negative action because the single principle 
espoused by the First Amendment "prohibits classification in terms 
of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."78 What 
does this do to tax exemptions for church-owned property, for gov-
ernment chaplains, and for state recognition of an individual's right 
not to work on Saturday if his religion forbids it,79 etc.? Kurland 
admits the adoption of such "rules of decision" are perhaps outdated. 
Nevertheless he considers them essential if the vital concept of legal 
certainty is to be salvaged.80 As Justice Douglas observed in ZQrach, 
and as has been demonstrated throughout constitutional adjudication 
on preferred liberties, these questions by nature are matters of degree 
and not of doctrinal categorization. 
Efforts to deal with the issue recognize this inherent aspect of 
degree. These efforts have ranged from an attempt to formulate a 
flexible standard while retaining a fixed reference point81 to an 
outright endorsement of the case by case empirical process.82 The 
former theory is espoused by Alan Schwarz, whose· reference point 
is "np imposition of religion." In essence, this "does no more than 
prohibit government from compelling or influencing religious choice . 
• • • "88 Since aid to parochial schools (or universities since Schwarz 
feels it should not make any difference)84 will not "ordinarily" induce 
the adoption of the Catholic religion, then such aid would not violate 
the no imposition standard.811 The matter of degree is relevant here 
if such aid would free church funds to be used for proselytizing efforts. 
Cases of this type would have to be determined by balancing the pos-
sibility of making such funds available with the public purpose to 
be served. This should not be a problem, however, says Schwarz, if 
the sectarian schools are in as bad shape as is alleged. Government 
aid would not reduce the church's educational expenditures but 
would only supplement them.86 
Individual states such as Massachusetts could profit by giving atten-
tion to this proposed standard. An overreaching program of aid that 
78 P. Kurland, Religion and the Law 112 (1961). 
79 See note 55 sl.'pra. 
80 P. Kurland, Religion and the Law 112 (1961). 
81 Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 
Yale L.J. 692 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Schwarz). 
82 Valente, Aid to Church Related Education - New Directions Without Dogma, 
55 Va. L. Rev. 579, 606 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Valente). 
88 Schwarz, 77 Yale L.J. at 727. 
84Id. at 736 n.I46. For a contrasting view, see Giannella, Religious Liberty, 
Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development Part II - The Nonestablishment 
Principle, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 5111 (1968). Giannella feels that, for the most part, 
church·related schools are religious at the precollege level but secular at the col· 
lege level. 
811 Id. at 724. 
86Id. at 7M-7117. 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/21
478 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSEITS LAW §18.1 
puts church money formerly used for education into activities other 
than education, instead of merely making it possible to maintain such 
schools, will not only be less popular among the opposition to such 
a program, but will provide further evidentiary material for chal-
lenging its validity. Also, Schwarz's standard seems attentive to the 
complexity of the issue and purports to be flexible enough to accom-
modate varying methods of governmental ventures into religious 
affairs. 
Yet, not all see merit in such a standard. William Valente, advocate 
of the above mentioned balancing process, considers Schwarz's scheme 
not only too complicated, but also far too rigid for a problem as 
unsettled and uncertain as this. Valente subscribes to a balancing 
technique, one that liberates the courts from the encumbrance of 
doctrinal priorities.87 The courts can analyze a given aid situation, 
determine the relative values of secular and religious effects, and act 
accordingly. This process can recognize changing values and evolving 
standards as such without having to make them into doctrines that 
stifle the development of the law and of society. Valente's answer to 
the problems of placing too much discretion in the judges and too 
little certainty in the law is simply that this particular issue is not 
susceptible to doctrinal compactness and that balancing provides a 
necessary testing period for embryonic legal developments.88 The fact 
is, however, that this issue is subject to doctrinal compactness, and it is 
only Valente's opinion that it should not be. Notwithstanding his justi-
fications, it seems that Valente is simply acknowledging the problem of 
the lack of an enunciated direction by the court on the issue, and 
recommending that it continue. This is an attractive theory since it 
avoids having to deal intellectually and constitutionally with complex 
differences in doctrinal approach and leaves to the Supreme Court the 
task of appraising situations "by a process that tests as it creates."89 
However sufficient this may be for one concerned only with studying 
the Court's vacillations, it is not sufficient for those in need of direction 
to enable them to deal with present conditions. These are people who 
must design, or decline to design, legislation on the aid issue, as well as 
those most directly affected by such aid or the lack of it. Legislators can 
not depend on such an approach to critical issues unless they are to 
settle for hit-and-miss propositions. In deciding upon legislation, they 
must consider constitutional tenets as such and not as elastic standards 
that adjust to topical problems. This is what Valente is in effect grant-
ing the lawmakers. Professor Schwarz', approach, at least; seems to 
attempt a theoretical interpretation of the First Amendment, i.e., 
prohibition of government influence on one's choice of religion in 
any way. This indicates that anything less is permissible. Yet it recog-
87 Valente, 55· Va. L. Rev. at 602·603. 
88 Id. at 606-608. 
89Id. at 608, quoting A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous BranCh 89 (1962). 
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nizes the problem of degree inherent in any attempt to measure the 
various contours of different types of aid legislation, and provides for 
a limited balancing process to deal with it. 
The Supreme Court is again considering· the public aid issue. The 
Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue is Board of Education 
v. Allen. This case has left many questions unanswered and for the 
moment unanswerable. The decision held constitutional a New York 
statute90 that required local public school authorities to lend textbooks 
free of charge to all schoolchildren between the grades of 7 and 12, 
including those attending private and parochial schools. The pro-
cedural history of the case is illustrative of the scope of opinion on the 
subject. The trial court held that the statute violated both clauses of 
the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and N.Y. Const. 
art. 11, §103. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering the complaint 
dismissed because the plan tiffs lacked standing. However, it discussed 
the merits of the case at some length and declared the law to be 
completely neutral with respect to religion. The New York Court of 
Appeals reversed, acknowledging the plaintiff's standing and holding 
the statute constitutional.91 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
written by Justice White, applied the primary purpose and effect test 
last propounded in the Schempp case. In the Court's view, the New 
York statute passed the test since the express purpose of the legislature 
in enacting the statute was the advancement of educational oppor-
tunity to the young. The Court placed the difficult burden of proof 
as to the religious effect of the statute upon the complainants, and no 
such evidence had been offered. The books were furnished to the 
children, not to the schools, and were only those approved by secular 
boards of education and designated for use in any public school. The 
Court recognized the dual purpose of religious schools asserted in the 
Pierce92 case and noted social interest in maintaining equally high 
standards in parochial schools as well as public schools. The Court 
could not accept without substantial evidence the complainant'S argu-
ment that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the 
educational processes in these schools is so permeated with religious 
training that secular textbooks would in fact be instrumental in 
religious instruction. This is the argument that had been used by the 
complainants in Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works of 
Md. and adopted by the Maryland Supreme Court in striking down 
the state aid programs.9B There the court applied a set of standards 
to determine the "religiousness" of the schools involved. These stan-
dards ranged from the stated purpose of the schools and the composi-
00 N.Y. Education Law §701(1l) (McKinney 1966). 
91 20 N.Y.2d 109,281 N.Y.s.2d 799, 228 N.E.2d 791 (1968). 
92 House Bill No. 10117. See Appendix 1 infra. 
98 Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works of Md., 242 Md. 645, 220 
A.2d 51 (1966), cert. denied, 1185 U.s. 97 (1966). 
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tion of its governing board and student body, to the place of religion 
in the curriculum and the image of the school in the community.94 The 
majority in Allen concluded that in the absence of evidence about 
particular schools it could not, on the basis of judicial notice alone, 
declare the statute unconstitutional as a prohibited involvement of 
the state in religious instruction.olS In choosing not to remand for 
possible findings of such evidence, the Court was either content to 
rely on the Pierce dual purpose theory or was satisfied that the secular 
purpose served could not, in this particular instance, have a "primary 
effect" of aiding religion.96 If the former was the basis of the court's 
decision, states like Massachusetts that are contemplating programs of 
private school aid would have had a broader base upon which to draft 
legislation. Yet the Court gave enough of a warning about the weight 
that would be given to evidence demonstrating a law's "operative 
effect" so as to narrow that base substantially. The states must draft 
legislation carefully to avoid results like those in Horace Mann. Hence 
the issue of state aid to private schools in different situations and in 
varying forms remains open to constitutional scrutiny. Whether it is 
colleges or parochial schools that are involved, evidence of an intense 
religious atmosphere established through standards like those utilized 
in Horace Mann could invalidate a statute that resulted "in unconstitu-
tional involvement with the state in religious instruction." 
Since the Supreme Court has developed no fixed set of guidelines, 
a test of constitutionality offered, by a concurring justice is notable. 
Justice Harlan stated he would examine the purpose of the law in-
volved but would also weigh the possibility of the law so entangling 
the state within the realm of religion that divisiveness and loss of 
religious freedom would result.07 This standard could be the future 
measuring device for constitutional challenges in the area. Its pragmatic 
yet fundamentalist approach may appeal to the reorganized court if it 
felt that more expansive forms of aid than those held valid in Allen 
should be prohibited, even though they might pass the broad qualifica-
tions of the purp?se. and effect test. To be sure, the next test case that 
comes before the Court will not lack evidentiary material directed at 
demonstrating religious permeation. The Court may then look for a 
new standard, and Justice Harlan's criteria of legislative purpose and 
practical, long-term result could prove the appropriate measuring rod. 
The same d~y that the Court handed down the A llen decision, it 
also announced its decision in Flast v. Cohen.os This case gave to tax-
payers standing to sue in cases where a logical nexus could be estab-
lished between his status as a taxpayer and the type of legislation being 
94Id. at 672, 220 A.2d at 65. 
OIS Board of Education v. Allen, 592 U.S. 256, 248 (1968). 
06 Drinan, Does State Aid to Church-Related Colleges Constitute An Establish-
ment of Religion? - Reflections on the Maryland College Cases, 1967 Utah L. Rev. 
491,498. 
07 Board of Education v. Allen, 592 U.s. 256, 249 (1968). 
98592 u.s. 85 (1968). 
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attacked. In Flast. New York taxpayers challenged the constitutionality 
of the Elementary and Secondary School Act providing for federal aid 
to private schools. Since the 1922 case of Massachusetts v. Mellon,DD 
the Supreme Court had denied that such standing existed, deeming 
such challenges political questions and stating that without direct 
injury over and above minute contribution to the taxes that paid for 
the bill, the complainants had no right to sue. In Flast. however, Chief 
Justice Warren, speaking for eight members of the Court, felt that 
policy considerations that had grown out of the taxpayer's status had 
somehow developed into a constitutional tenet.100 Policy notwithstand-
ing, the Court said that if the law challenged was an exercise of 
Congressional power under the taxing and spending clause (U.S. Const. 
art. 1 §8), and if a logical nexus or interconnection could be established 
between the taxpayer's status and the constitutional transgression 
alleged, then as such, a taxpayer would have a fundamental stake in 
the outcome and thus standing to sue. In Flast. the law challenged was 
an exercise of the taxing and spending power of Congress and the 
constitutional violation alleged was expenditure of public funds so 
raised in favor of one religion over another. Thus, the alleged violation 
was of a specific Constitutional limitation on the Congressional power. 
The taxpayer was contributing to this expenditure, so the nexus was 
established and standing granted, since the Court felt that the adversity 
necessary to produce a proper challenge of the constitutionality of a 
Congressional act was present. Flast thus facilitates such challenges and 
also probably challenges of state laws alleged to be unconstitutional 
through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Statutes that 
are open to such attack include the one being contemplated by the 
Massachusetts legislature. The right to challenge a state law is thus 
no longer limited to those who demonstrate more than a taxpayer's 
stake in the outcome of the suit.101 A Massachusetts taxpayer has 
standing in federal court to challenge a state law as in violation of the 
federal constitution. A Massachusetts taxpayer, or rather a group of 
24, can also seek to restrain the Commonwealth's expenditure of money 
that is alleged to be unconstitutional in an equity action in the Su-
preme Judicial Court or in superior court.102 
Two bills introduced into the Massachusetts House in the 1969 session, 
Nos. 4418 and 4419, (see Appendixes 3 and 4) proposed that the state 
pay the salaries of parochial school teachers of nonreligious subjects. 
Programs similar to this exist in several states, including Rhode Island, 
99262 u.s. 447 (1922). 
100 Flast v. Cohen, 1I92 U.S. 811, 97 (1968). 
101 In Doremus v. Board of Education, 1I42 U.s. 429 (1952), the Supreme Court 
held that taxpayers did not offer a justifiable claim in challenging a state law 
in the federal court because they had not shown a particular financial interest. 
This decision was based upon Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 477 (1922), which, 
of course, has been substantially replaced by Flast. 
102 G.L., C. 29, §611. Even before this statute was passed in 19117, this right was 
recognized in Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 1I47, 44 N.E. 446 (1896). See also Sears 
v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 1I27 Mass. 1I10, 98 N.E.2d 621 (1951). 
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Pennsylvania and Connecticut. Up to August 1968, there have been 
over 30 lawsuits challenging aid statutes,l08 the most recent in the 
Connecticut Federal District Court. The ten plaintiffs in that suit 
include the American Civil Liberties Union and the Connecticut 
Branch of the NAACP. In addition to claiming alleged violation of 
both state and federal constitution, plaintiffs argued that such aid as 
the subject bill provides would contribute to de facto segregation in 
the private schools in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.l04 
This interesting contention is apparently based on the fact that 
parochial schools are in general almost exclusivley white, due to the 
low number of urban black Catholics. This de facto argument is also 
being urged in opposition to the growing demand for community 
control of schools. Thus, both issues are bound to become intertwined 
as the public demands their resolution - a situation which should 
have profound effects on the school system in any state where the 
electorate is comprised of citizens who will be directly affected by the 
outcome of either controversy. 
As for the First Amendment issues involved, the validity of state 
payment of the salaries of private school teachers who teach non-
religious subjects has not as yet been decided by the Supreme Court. 
While the Allen case, as far as it goes, is in general support of the 
constitutionality of this type of program, it has several negative im-
plications. First, the child benefit theory will not be available to the 
program's advocates, although it has been advanced from CochranlOIS in 
1929 through Allenl06 in 1968. In the case of the busing in Everson 
and the book provisions in Allen, the parents had previously borne 
these expenses and the statute was consequently operating to their 
benefit and not to that of the private school itself. The schools could 
not be said to be directly aided since it was not being relieved of any 
expense.l07 However, in the case of a state paying teachers' salaries, 
the funds will presumably go directly to the school for distribution or 
for reimbursenment. The child benefit theory is premised on the 
school's receiving nothing. Second, teachers are considered more crucial 
in the educational development of the child, and lay parochial school 
teachers at best may be said to fail to discourage the inclusion of 
religious materials and discussion in the conduct of even secular studies. 
Evidentiary matter to this effect will doubtless be presented in suits 
challenging these appropriations. Third, since the school did once 
pay for this service, aid may make church funds available for proselytiz-
ing efforts. This contention could be negated if it were shown that the 
individual schools were in such poor fiscal condition that the aid 
108 Monograph 2, ABA Section of Individual Rights Be Responsibilities 8 (1968), 
quoting Dean R. F. Drinan. 
104. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1969, at 84, col. 5. 
lOIS Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 u.s. 870, 875 (1929). 
106 See Brief for Appellees, 20 L. Ed. 1700·1701. 
107 Board of Education v. Allen, 892 U.s. 286, 244 n.6 (1968). 
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merely helped them meet operating costS.lOS This could be the case in 
many areas of Massachusetts. However, it is possible that this state, if 
it is to aid private schools, will provide aid over and above that which 
the parish or organization would have had to expend to maintain or 
increase the standard of education to the level of the state's public 
Jschools. Aid in excess of this level would indeed be making funds 
available for a proselytizing function and hence increase the prob-
ability of encountering constitutional hazards. This borderline concern 
would be obviated if the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
to accept outright the free exercise argument of aid proponents.l09 
This, however, seems unlikely in view of the cautious pace the Court 
has maintained on this issue in the past. Advocates of the balancing 
approach to this problem are likely to see this process implemented 
by, as Valente describes it, "an ad hoc balancing of the competing 
interests and values under the religion clauses."110 
The economic argument for Massachusetts to initiate an aid pro-
gram to parochial schools is indeed formidable and undoubtedly is in 
large measure responsible for the proposed constitutional amendment's 
easy passage through the General Court on its initial vote. It is 
expected to receive as little opposition when taken to a vote the 
required second time before going to the people for ratification. It 
seems, however, that the amendment, with its aforementioned defects 
of contradictory language and questionable overbreadth, is a poorly 
drafted document that could raise more problems than it solves.lll 
The legislature is confronted with a situation that demands a decision 
on the school aid issue. Yet it should not hasten to adopt an amend-
ment that may not even meet present ills and whose language is certain 
to cause a considerable amount of unrest in the future. Problems could 
arise shortly after a program is implemented if the legislature takes the 
amendment as its reference point and exceeds First Amendment 
bounds in an expansive aid program. It should consider the mistakes 
of its forerunners of 1917 who allowed political and personal ambition 
as well as outright group prejudices to deny themselves an under-
standing of the complexity of the issue before them. Blind acceptance 
of proposed bills of great constitutional import reflect legislative im-
maturity. Such bills may produce temporary relief from the present 
crisis, but they will not have the clarity and precision that a constitu-
tional provision demands. Professor Paul Freund has stated that the 
Supreme Court should draw the line of permissible aid to private 
schools under the federal constitution at those programs held per-
lOS See, for example, the Connecticut statute, Public Act 791, §26, which allows 
only a 20 percent reimbursement of the teacher's allotment (§5). This can go as 
high as 60 percent in areas where two-thirds of the children are "educationally 
deprived" (§ll). See text at note 2 supra. 
109 For full explication see materials on Drinan, Pages 476-477 supra, text and 
note 77. 
110 Valente, 55 Va. L. Rev. 579, 614 (1969). 
111 See Appendix 1 for full text of the bill. 
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xp.issible in the Allen case. This, he suggests, would take the issue out 
of the political process, thus avoiding dangerous division along reli-
gious lines.1l2 This is perhaps an overstatement of the manifest in-
ability of some legislatures to avoid such pressures and their repeated 
failure to examine a delicate question with a requisite concern for its 
complexity. That concern could perhaps be stimulated in Massachu-
setts by an understanding of the state's past experience with this 
issue and also by an appreciation of the current status of the problem 
on a national as well as on a local level. 
Finally, a sense of responsibility for the profound effect that any 
constitutional action will have on the future of education in Massa-
chusetts must be nurtured if an appropriate response to the problem is 
to be forthcoming. 
APPENDIX I 
HOUSE BILL No. 1087 
Article XVIII of the articles of amendment to the constitution of 
the commonwealth is hereby amended by striking out section 2 and 
inserting in place thereof the following section: -
Section 2. No grant, appropriation or use of public money or prop-
erty of loan of credit shall be made or authorized by the common-
wealth or any political subdivision thereof for the purpose of found-
ing, maintaining or aiding any infirmary, hospital, institution, or 
charitable or religious undertaking which is not publicly owned and 
under the exclusive control, order and supervision of public officers 
or public agents authorized by the conunonwealth or federal authority 
or both, except that appropriations may be made for the maintenance 
and support of the Soldiers' Home in Massachusetts and for free 
public libraries in any city or town, and to carry out legal obligations, 
if any, already entered into; and no such grant, appropriation or use 
of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made or 
authorized for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding any 
church, religious denomination or society. Nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to prevent the commonwealth· from making grants-
in-aid to private educational institutions in such manner as may be 
provided by the general court. 
APPENDIX II 
HOUSE BILL No. 4980 
Resolved, That a special commission, to consist of three members of 
the senate, seven members of the house of representatives, the attorney 
general or his designee, the commissioner of education or his designee, 
and nineteen persons to be appointed by the governor, one of whom 
112 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1692 (1969). 
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shall be a member of the Massachusetts Bar Association, one shall be 
a member of the American Civil Liberties Union, one shall be a 
member of the Massachusetts Association of School Committees, one 
shall be a member of the Massachusetts Association of School Super-
intendents, one shall be a member to the Massachusetts Congress of 
Parents and Teachers, one shall be a member of the Massachusetts 
Teachers' Association, one shall be a member of the Massachusetts 
Federation of Teachers, one shall be a member of the Massachusetts 
Association of Independent Schools, one shall be a member of the 
Massachusetts Urban League, one shall be the Superintendent of 
Schools of the Archdioces of Boston, one shall be a member of the 
Massachusetts Council of Churches, one shall be a member of the 
Jewish Community Council, one shall be a member of the Massachu-
setts Taxpayers Foundation, one shall be a member of the Massachu-
setts Selectmen's Association, one shall be a member of the Massachusetts 
Mayors' Association, and four shall be representative of the general 
public, is hereby established for the purpose of making an investiga-
tion and study relative to public financial aid to non-public primary 
and secondary schools. Said commission shall specifically, but without 
limiting the generality of the foregoing, consider (1) the degree of 
need for public aid by non-public primary and secondary schools, (2) 
the effects on local tax rates in the event of the closing of said non-
public schools, (8) the effects on public schools of providing aid to 
non-public schools, (4) the cost in terms of taxation for providing 
public aid to non-public schools, (5) the need to impose further public 
standards and regulations on non-public schools, (6) the implications 
of certain provisions of the federal constitution and the constitution 
of the commonwealth, (7) the possible proliferation of non-public 
schools resulting from public aid, (8) other possible alternatives to 
financial aid, (9) the results of other states involved with public 
financial aid to non-public primary and secondary schools, and (9) 
[sic] any other related matter. Said commission may call upon any 
department, board, or commission of the commonwealth and any sub-
division thereof for such information as it may deem necessary for 
its purposes. Said commission may require by summons the attendance 
and testimony under oath of witnesses and the production of books, 
records and papers. Said commission may travel outside the common-
wealth. Said commission shall report to the general court on or before 
the first Wednesday of January, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. 
APPENDIX III 
HOUSE BILL No. 4418 
Notwithstanding any contrary provisions of law, cities and towns, 
subject to the approval of their school committees, are hereby au-
thorized to pay the salary of each lay teacher in private and parochial 
schools in the grades of kindergarten to the twelfth grade, inclusive, 
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provided that their teaching does not include any religious or denom-
inational instruction. The commonwealth is hereby authorized and 
directed annually, on or before November twentieth, to reimburse 
such cities and towns for all expenditures made under the provisions 
of this act. 
APPENDIX IV 
HOUSE BILL No. 4419 
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, the commonwealth, 
subject to the approval of the board of education, is hereby author-
ized to pay the salary of each lay teacher in parochial and private 
schools in the cities and towns of the commonwealth in the grades of 
kindergarten to twelfth grade, inclusive; provided, that their teach-
ing class does not include any religious or denominational instruction. 
MARK LEDDY 
§18.2. Due process in the schools. Privately controlled and pri-
vately financed educational institutions have long had almost com-
plete discretion to suspend, expel, or refuse to grant a degree to a 
student.1 A student who objected to disciplinary action could petition 
the courts for relief.2 Traditionally, such cases have been argued solely 
on common law theories.3 However, there have been many cases in 
recent years in which the students have raised constitutional issues 
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution" 
This Comment will review the theories of constitutional law which 
§18.2. 1 Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 2!11 N.Y.8. 4!15 (1928) 
(student expelled from university for not being "typical Syracuse girl"; court 
upheld university's action); Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 
(192!1) (student dismissed without explanation; court upheld the university's action). 
2 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its students - A Fiduciary Theory, 
54 Ky. L.J. 64!1, 651 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Goldman); 6 Minn. L. Rev. 415 
(1922). 
8Zanders v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 755 (W.D. 
La. 1968); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 6!17 (1924); Golt 
v. Berea College, 156 Ky. !l76, 161 S.W. 204 (19I!1); Baltimore Univ. v.Colton, 98 
Md. 62!1, 57 A. 14 (1904); Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Academic 
Freedom, 20 U. Fla. L. Rev. 290 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, The 
Judicial Trend); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Stu-
dents, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. !l68, !l75 (196!1) (hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Pro-
cedural Due Process); Van Alltyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule 
Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 
Law in Transition Q. I, 2 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne, Student Ac-
ademic Freedom); Comment, Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 
Harv. L. Rev; 1045, 1144 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Comment, Developments); 
Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 9O!I, 912 (1958). 
4 Marino v. Waters, 220 So.2d SO!l (La. 1969); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia 
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 5!15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 7!1 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process, 10 U.CL.AL. Rev. at !l74. 
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are relevant in cases where a student is disputing disciplinary action 
taken against him. In particular, the comment will focus on the Mas-
sachusetts case of Sturm v. Boston Univ.,1l decided in the 1969 SURVEY 
year by the Suffolk County Superior Court. 
For the past several decades, private universities have based their 
power to expel, suspend or refuse to grant a degree to a student on 
contract law theory.6 Under contract law, the university was treated 
as a seller of an educational degree and the student as a buyer.7 The 
university enjoyed broad discretion under this theory because the 
university had the bargaining power to require a student to agree to 
abide by rules and procedures which favored the university as a con-
dition of enrollment.8 The reluctance of the courts to interfere in 
the internal affairs of a college or university further enhanced the 
advantage of the institution in its relationship with the students.9 
Commentators have argued against continued use of the contract 
theory on two grounds: (1) the theory does not sufficiently protect 
the interests of the students against arbitrary treatment by the insti-
tution;10 (2) the theory does not reflect the true relationship between 
student and university, which, it is felt, is not similar to that between 
parties of a contract.11 
Having had little defense against arbitrary disciplinary actions un-
der common law theory, many student litigants in recent cases have 
raised the issue of whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment can be applied to universities which are now treated as 
private.12 The possibility of bringing privately controlled and en-
dowed universities under the Fourteenth Amendment is suggested 
by cases in which the Fourteenth Amendment was applied to tax-
sppported public educational institutions.1S The courts once permitted 
Il Equity No. 84433 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1969). 
6 Barker v. Byrn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1925); Goldman, 54 Ky. 
L.J. at 651; Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1145. 
7 Hoadley v. Allen,108 Cal. App. 468, 291 P. 601 (1930); Goldman, 54 Ky. L. J. 
at 651. 
8 Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); Goldman, 
54 Ky. L. J. at 653; Note,35 Colum. L. Rev. 898 (1935); see Boston College Univer-
sity Student Guide 1969-1970, at 14: "The College reserves the right to dismiss at 
any time a student who fails to give satisfactory evidence of earnestness of purpose 
and active co-operation in all requirements of academic work." 
9 Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.W. Va. 1968); Blackwell v. 
Issaquena County Board of Education, !l63 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966); Leonard 
v. School Committee of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468, 14 A.L.R.!ld 
1192 (1965); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Watson 
v. City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 52 N.E. 864 (1895); Goldman, 54 Ky. L.J. 
at 661; Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1150. 
10 Goldman, 54 Ky. L.J. at 653; Seavey, Dismissal of Students: Due Process, 70 
Harv. L. Rev. 1406 (1957). 
11 Goldman, 54 Ky. L.J. at 652; Comment, 45 Denver L.J. 533 (1968). 
12 Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 
609 (D.D.C. 1967). /' 
11 Due v. Florida A. Be M. Univ., 255 F. Supp~ 596 (N.D. Fla. 1965); Dixon v. 
28
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/21
488 1969 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSElTS LAW §18.2 
public univenities nearly as much discretion in disciplinary matten 
as private univenities had,14 However, in 1961, a federal court of ap-
peals started a new trend in the case of Dixon v. Alabama.1/) Dixon 
limited the discretion of tax-supported universities in disciplinary 
matters by requiring them to observe due process of the law as im-
posed by the Fourteenth Amendment.16 The Fourteenth Amendment 
states in part: "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... " 
These words have long been held to govern the actions of states.17 
In addition, the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment have 
been applied to non-tax-supported universities on the grounds that 
such a university is an agency or instrumentality of the state, and 
therefore actions of the univenity can fairly be treated as actions by 
the state.18 If no contact with the state was found, the Fourteenth 
Amendment could not be applied because of the line of authority 
beginning with Civil Rights Cases of 188S, which holds that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not govern "merely private action, however 
discriminatory or wrongful."19 Many cases have turned on the ques-
tion of whether the acts of a particular organization or individual 
could be considered state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2o 
In Dixon, the fifth circuit ordered Alabama State College, a tax-
supported institution, to reinstate several black students who had been 
expelled, presumably for their part in off-campus sit-in demonstra-
tions.21 The court found that Alabama State, as an agent of the state, 
was required to observe procedural due process in disciplinary actions 
Alabama, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961): Knight v. State Board of Education, 200 
F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). 
14 Steier v. N.Y. State Education Commissioner, 271 F.2d Ill, 16 (2d Cir. 1959); 
Hamilton v. University of California, 295 U.S. 245 (1934): Van Alstyne, Procedural 
Due Process, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. at 1169. (Van Alstyne argues that, on the basis of 
a survey of disciplinary proceedings at state colleges, tax-supported institutions 
still retain nearly as much discretion in disciplinary matters as private educational 
institutions.): Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 11M. 
1/) 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
16 Ibid. 
17 United States v. Guest, 11811 U.s. 745 (1966); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. II (1883): 
Hale, Rights Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Against Injuries In-
flicted by Private Individuals. 6 Lawyers Guild Rev. 627 (1946) (hereinafter cited 
as Hale). 
18 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.s.C. 1967); 
Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
19 Shelley v. Kraemer, liM u.s. I, III (1948); and see Cooper v. Aaron, 1158 U.S. 
1 (1958): Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 45 Cornell L.Q. 375 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Abernathy, Expansion 
of the State Action Concept): Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. 
L. Rev. 10811 (1960). 
20 Shelley v .. Kraemer, 11114 U.s.· 1 (1948); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane 
Univ., on rehearing, 2011 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), rev'd on rehearing, 212 F. 
Supp. 674 (E.D, La. 1962). 
21 Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d .150, 152 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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taken against the black students, and that it failed to do SO.22 By way 
of dicta, the court specified the character of the safeguards that would 
satisfy due process requirements: 
... the student should be given the names of the witnesses 
against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which 
each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to 
present to the board, or at least to an administrative official of 
the college, his own defense against the charges and too produce 
either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf. 
If the hearing is not before the board directly, the results of the 
findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to 
the student's inspection.23 
Other procedural safeguards which mayor should be required in 
student disciplinary proceedings have been suggested by various com-
mentators and courtS.24 Among these are the right to appeal,211 the 
right to have an advisor present at the hearing at which the student 
gives his defense,26 the right to a public hearing,27 the right to cross-
examine witnesses when possible,28 and the privilege against self-in-
crimination.29 
One commentator, in discussing due process in disciplinary actions 
at tax-supported universities, suggests that the degree of due process 
required for a particular situation be ascertained by balancing two 
variables: (1) the degree of harm which could result to the student 
from the proceedings against him, and (2) the administrative incon-
venience and expense of granting specific procedural safeguards.8o In 
practice, a student accused of breaking a serious university rule and 
who might therefore be subject to serious disciplinary measures would 
be provided more procedural safeguards than a student who is accused 
of lesser infractions. Procedural safeguards which are expensive and 
difficult for the university to provide will be required in fewer cases 
than safeguards which are inexpensive and easy to implement.81 For 
22 Id. at 155. 
28Id. at 159. 
24. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend, 20 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 295 (extensive treat-
ment of procedure which the author suggests should be used in student disciplin-
ary proceedings). 
211 Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42 Texas L. Rev. 
!l44, !l61 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Johnson); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process, 
10 U.C.L.AL. Rev. at !lS6. 
26 Id. at !lS6. 
27 Heyman, Some Thoughts on University Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 Calif. L. 
Rev. 7!1, 79 (1966) (practical suggestions on ways in which Berkeley could reform 
its disciplinary procedures); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process, 10 U.C.L.A.L. 
Rev. at !l86. 
28 Ibid. See also Comment, Developments, SI Harv. L. Rev. at 1140. 
29 Johnson, 42 Texas L. Rev. at !l56. 
80Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. at !lSI, lISlI. 
81 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 
1967); Hannah v. Larche, !l6!1 U.S. 420,442 (1960); State ex. rei. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 
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example, notice of charges against the student places so light a burden 
on the institution that it appears to be required in all but exceptional 
cases.32 On the other hand, the formal observance of the rules of ev-
idence, requires the expense of hiring persons trained in law, and has 
never been required of universities in student disciplinary hearings.ss 
In past cases, the courts have not applied Dixon to private institu-
tions because the requisite state action could not be found. But in 
the recent case of Sturm v. Boston Univ.,S4 the Suffolk County Supe-
rior Court found that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did apply to Boston University, even though Boston University 
is privately controlled and privately financed.s5 
The case arose from an alleged violation of Boston University exam 
regulations by Sturm, a sophomore at the university. Sturm left the 
examination room during an exam without leaving his exam paper 
with the proctor as required by regulations. He returned after the 
exam period had ended and tried to hand in his exam. The professor 
refused to accept his paper. Before Sturm left the room in which the 
professor was sorting exam booklets, he left his exam on a table with 
booklets which had been separated and arranged in order for grad-
ing. The professor brought charges against Sturm, alleging that he 
attempted to sneak his paper into a pile for correction in spite of the 
professor's unequivocal rejection of the paper.sa 
The court did not consider the merits of the charges, but found for 
Sturm on the grounds that the procedure through which Sturm had 
been expelled was unfair and unjust, and did not conform to the re-
quirements of procedural due process.3T Specifically, (1) the rule which 
Sturm was accused of violating was unpublished;s8 (2) the university 
had failed to provide adequate notice of the charges brought against 
Sturm;S9 (3) Sturm had been given no opportunity to arrange to have 
an advisor present during the hearing at which he made his defense;40 
(4) some members of the Student Academic Conduct Committee, which 
decided what punishment the university would apply, had not been 
present during all of Sturm's defense, and some members of the com-
mittee were confused about what the charges were;41 (5) Sturm re-
81 Mont. 200, 26!1 P. 4!1!1 (1928); Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 
11!18 (review of cases concerning witnesses and cross· examination at college dis· 
ciplinary hearings). 
82 Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 892 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968); Schiff v. Hannah, 
282 F. Supp. !l81 (W.D. Mich. 1966). 
ss Goldberg v. Regents,_ 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 881, 57 Cal. Rptr. 46!1, 47!1 (1967); 
Due v. Florida A. Be M. Univ., 2!1!1 F. Supp. !l96, 4O!I (N.D. Fla. 1963); Comment, 
Developments, note !I supra, at 1141. 
84 Equity No. 844!1!1 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1969). 
85 See Cranney v. Boston Univ., 1!19 F. Supp; 1!IO (D. Mass. 1956). 
88 Sturm v. Boston Univ., Equity No. 844!1!1, at I, 2 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., 
Apr. 18, 1969). 
8T Id. at 4. 
88 Ibid. 
89Id. at 6. 
40 Id. at 10. 
41 Id. at 11. 
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ceived no notice of his expulsion, due to administrative failures, until 
nearly four months after the action had been taken;42 and (6) no pro-
cedure for appeal or rehearing had been established, and no appeal 
was provided when requested.43 
The case of Sturm v. Boston Univ. is unique because the court 
treated the actions of Boston University, a privately endowed and 
privately controlled institution, as state action within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The requirements of due process with reference to procedural 
safeguards referred to in paragraphs I and 2 above, which have 
generally been applied only to public universities, so-called, should 
be applied in this case, particularly with reference to requiring 
BU to exercise basic fairness and justice toward the plaintiff. 
Although some courts have limited this requirement, as noted, to 
public or state-operated universities, and the like, the principle 
has been extended to quasi-public universities, in some jurisdic-
tions. Examination of these authorities has led me to the conclu-
sion that, in the type of case involved in this litigation, continued 
non-application of the principle of due process has little, if any, 
validity.44 
In order to apply the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the court had to find a way in which the actions of the private 
institution could fairly be treated as actions of the state. Courts in 
the past have found state action in either of two ways. They have 
either examined the activity itself to determine whether the activity 
was one which is inherently governmental in nature;45 or they have 
sought factors in the relationship between the institution and the state 
which indicate control48 and participation4T of the state in the activ-
ities of the institution. 
If a court finds that an activity is inherently governmental, it will 
apply the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of the relationship of 
the state to the organization carrying on the activity.48 An inherently 
governmental function is so closely related to the functions normally 
carried on by a government that it cannot be carried on in the pri-
vate realm without the application of the safeguards of the Fourteenth 
42Id. at 12. 
43Id. at 9. 
44Id. at 5. 
45 Terry v. Adams, !l45 U.S. 461 (195!1); Marsh v. Alabama, !l26 U.S. 501 (1946). 
48Eaton v. James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958); 
Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D.C., 157 F. Supp. 101, 108 (D.C. 
1957); Norris v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt 
Free Library, 149 F.2d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 1945); Abernathy, Expansion of the State 
Action Concept, 4!1 Cornell L.Q. at !l87-!l90. 
47 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 28 F.2d 5!11 (5th Cir. 1960) (city directed 
its police force to enforce seating regulations instituted by private transit company); 
Shelley v. Kraemer, !I!I4 U.S. I (1948). 
48 Terry v. Adams, !l45 U.s. 461 (195!1); Marsh v. Alabama, !l26 U.S. 501 (1946); 
Smith v. Allwright, 521 U.s. 649 (1944). 
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Amendm.en~.48 In ascertaining whether an activity is inherently gov-
ernmental, the courts consider the consequences of the activity.GO If 
the activity influences the rights of individuals in a way that a state 
could do only in conformance with the Constitution, and if that in-
fluence is related to the major functions of government, such as hold-
ing elections,1Il or controlling speech,1I2 a coun will hold that the 
activity cannot be carried on without the safeguards of the constitution. 
In the Sturm case, the superior court apparently found state action 
in the quasi-judicial power which Boston University'S Student Ac-
ademic Conduct Committee wielded over the students. liS The committee 
conducted hearings in which it received accusations and defenses, 
heard testimony of witnesses and made findings of fact.1I4 Its power 
consisted of the right to recommend to the dean of the university any 
punishment within the power of the university to inflict.1I11 
The superior court found that the punishment of expulsion, which 
was meted out to Sturm, would have serious and permanent effects 
upon the life and career of Sturm.1ie The court noted that Sturm's 
reputation would be damaged, that his chance to attain an education 
of equal quality would be jeopardized, that his earning power would 
be impaired, and that the opportunities to pursue the career of his 
choice would be limited. liT Such serious disabilities, the court reasoned, 
should not be inflicted upon a student without the procedural safe-
guards of due process. lIS The court found that the consequences of the 
committee's acts were so similar to the consequences of the actions of 
a court of law that the committee could not conduct its activities 
immune from the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.1I9 
Two leading Supreme Court cases, Marsh v. A.labama60 and Terry 
v. A.dams,61 rely on the theory that an activity by its governmental 
nature may be subject to the Founeenth Amendment regardless of 
48 Evans v. Newton, 582 U.S. 296 (1966). 
110 Terry v. Adams, 545 U.8.461, 469·470 (1953); Evans v. Newton, 582 u.s. 296 
(1966). 
111 Terry v. Adams, 545 u.s. 461 (1955). 
112 Marsh v. Alabama, 526 U.s. 501 (1946). 
lIS Sturm v. Boston Univ., Equity No. 84455, at 12 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., 
Apr. 18, 1969). 
1141d. at 2. 
1111 Ibid. 
1161d. at 12; and see, Goldman, 54 Ky. LJ. at 659·660. 
liT Sturm v. Boston Univ., Equity No. 84455, at 12 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., 
Apr. 18, 1969). 
lIS Ibid. 
118 Ibid. (Expulsion, therd6re, not only affects the student scholastically, but 
can affect him personally, permanently and economically in his adult life. "[T]his 
action by SACC and the dean, is a judicial determination with reference to the 
conduct of the plaintiff. In this area, 1;IU must apply procedures which are basically 
fair and just, and DU failed to do that in this instance.') 
60 526 U.s. 501 (1946). 
61345 U.s. 461 (1955). 
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who engages in the activity. Even though Sturm relies on the same 
theory, neither Marsh nor Terry are cited in the Sturm opinion. 
In Marsh, a peace officer of a town wholely owned by Gulf Ship-
building Corporation refused to permit the petitioner, a Jehovah's 
Witness, to distribute literature on the sidewalk owned by the cor-
poration. The court held that his actions violated the Fourteenth and 
First Amendments despite the fact that the peace officer was an agent 
of a private corporation. The court found the fact that all property 
was owned by· a single corporation insufficient to change the public 
nature of the town, which was for most purposes, exactly like a public 
town.62 The court made the argument that the sole owner of all the 
property in a town open for public use could have no more power to 
deny constitutional rights to the persons who use the town than could 
all the property owners of a public town acting in concert.68 After the 
Marsh decision, it would seem settled that the operation of a privately 
owned town open to the public is an activity so public in nature that 
the courts will apply the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individ-
uals in their relations with the town.6• 
In Terry v. Adams,61S the court held that a preliminary primary elec-
tion run by a private organization was an iniegral66 part of the official 
election process and therefore constituted state action. The Jaybird 
Democratic Association, which held "white primaries" in advance of 
integrated official primaries, could not exclude Negroes from voting 
without violating the Constitution.67 The court found that the state 
had transgressed the commands of the constitution in permitting the 
circumvention of the Fifteenth Amendment through private primaries. 
This case can stand for the proposition that state action may be found 
in the failure of the state to act to prevent a wrong it has a . duty to 
prevent.68 However, more properly, this case may read narrowly as 
holding that elections of public officials are so basically a governmental 
function that no private organization will be permitted to exert con-
62 Marsh v. Alabama, S26 U.s. 501, 506 (1946). 
68 Id. at 505. 
M See, Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 
Inc., S91 U.s. SOB (1969); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 
lOBS, 1096 (1960). 
611 S45 U.S. 461 (I95S). 
66Id. at 469. "The Jaybird primary has become an integral part, indeed the 
only effective part, of the elective process that determines who shall rule and 
govern in the country. The effect of the whole procedure ••• is to do precisely 
that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids - strip Negroes of every vestige 
of influence in selecting the officials who control the local county matters that 
intimately touch the daily lives of citizens." 
67Id. at 461 (195S). 
68Id. at 469. "For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes 
is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purpOses of the 
Fifteenth Amendment • • • it violates the Fifteenth Amendment for a state, by 
such circumvention, to permit within its borders the use of any device that pro-
duces the equivalent of the prohibited election." 
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trol. over the election process without coming under the control of 
the Constitution.6D 
Few cases have relied on the inherently governmental theory,70 
probably because the standards of the theory are not well defined.71 
At least two student plaintiffs have argued that "inherently govern-
mental function" includes any activity which is normally carried on 
by government. They have argued that education itself is inherently 
governmental, and, therefore, all educational. institutions should be 
brought under the constitution.72 At least one district judge, in dicta, 
has voiced support for the idea.73 In an effort to suggest a narrower 
definition, one commentator has interpreted inherently governmental 
functions as those which are indispensable to the maintenance of dem-
ocratic government.74 Marsh v. Alabama, then, would stand for the 
proposition that democratic government could not exist without free 
speech, and Terry v. Adams would stand for the proposition that free 
elections without racial discrimination are essential to democracy, 
Sturm v. Boston Univ., would fit into the scheme on the basis that a fair 
trial is essential to democracy. The apparent decisiveness of the test is 
illusory because nearly every individual freedom is arguably a quality 
without which our demo~cy could not exist. It might be argued that 
education is central to democracy because educated people are better 
able to govern their affairs. 
On the other hand, the theory of inherently governmental function 
has the advantage in that its actual application is self-limiting.711 For 
example, the court in Sturm did not find that the constitution applied 
to any part of the university except the Student Academic Conduct 
Committee, and then only when the committee was acting as a court.76 
In Marsh, the court applied the First and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation, only when it was engaged in pre-
venting freedom of speech in the company town.77 In Terry, the court 
found that the Jaybird Association was controlled by the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments only when conducting elections.78 Appar-
6D Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 10811, 1096 (1960). 
70 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
1191 U.S. 1108 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 1182 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, !l45 
U.S. 461 (19511); Marsh v. Alabama, 1126 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 1121 
U.S. 649 (1944). 
71 Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept, 411 Cornell L. Q. 1175 (1958). 
72 Grossner v. Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 5115, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Powe v. 
Miles, 407 F.2d 711, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). 
78 Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 2011 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962) rev'd on 
rehearing, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E. D. La. 1962); see, Comment, Developments, 81 
Harv. L. Rev. at 1060; Sturm v. Boston Univ., Equity No. 8441111, at III (Suffolk 
County Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1969). 
74 Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept, 411 Cornell L. Q. at 404. 
7IILewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 10811, 1119 (1960); 
Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1061. 
76 Sturm v. Boston Univ., Equity No. 8441111 (Suffolk County Super. Ct., Apr. 
18, 1969). 
77 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.s. 501 (1946). 
78 Terry v. Adams. !145 U.s. 461 (1955). 
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entIy, if the Jaybird Association held social picnics, the constitution 
would not demand that blacks be permitted to attend. 
Under usual circumstances, before a court turns to the inherently 
governmental theory, it will examine the institution itselF' to deter-
mine if the state is sufficiently involved in the activity of the institu-
tion "through any arrangement, management, funds, or property"ao 
to warrant a holding that the state either controls or participates in 
the activity of the institution. If the court finds sufficient state con-
tacts, it will hold that the activity of the institution is state action and 
will apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the activity.81 A contact 
with the state is any logical connection between the state and the in-
stitution.sa Hence, a federal court of appeals held that the fact that 
much of the income of a high school athletic association came from 
ticket sales for games played largely in or on state-owned facilities 
.operated as a contact with the state.83 Leases,84 regulatory authority 
over a private organization,8!) and grants of power by the state to an 
association86 have been considered sufficient contacts with the state 
to support a finding of state action. A case of state tax exemptions to 
private institutions, however, has not been found to be an' adequate 
contact to support such a finding.87 
The most usual means through which the state becomes involved 
in the activities of nonprofit institutions, such as universities, is through 
financial support.88 The courts have agreed that the receipt of financial 
TIl Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Pa. 1967): Poindexter •• 
Louisiana Financial Assistance Commn., 275 F. Supp. 888, 854, 855 (E.D. La.. 
1967). 
80 Cooper v. Aaron, !l58 U.S. I, 19 (1958). 
lit Cooper v. Aaron, !l58 U.S. I (1958). 
uLouisiana High School Athletic Assn. v. St. Augustine High School, S96 F.!d 
224, 227 (5th Cir. 1968) (employees of the Athetic Association were eligible to reo 
ceive retirement benefits under the State Teachers Retirement Act): Hampton Y. 
]acltsonville, !1M F.2d !l20 (5th Cir. 1962) (reversionary interest in property IIOld 
to individual by city). 
88 Louisiana High School Athletic Assn. •. St. Augustine High School~ 896 F.2d 
224 (5th Cir. 1968). 
84.Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674, 681 (E.D. La. 1962); Derrington 
v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956) cert. denied, 85!1 U.S. 924 (1957): 
Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept, 48 Cornell L.Q. at 894 et seq. 
(extensive treatment of state action problems arising from the leasing of State 
propeity): Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1088, 1099·1102 
(1960). 
III Public Utilities Commn. v. Pollak, 848 U.s. 451 (1952). This case in'VOlves the 
Fihh rather than the Fourteenth Amendment because it arose in the District of 
Columbia: but the differet1ce between the Fifth and the Fourteenth is probably 
DOt srellt enough to change the implications of the case. See also Comment, DevC!I· 
opments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1057·1058. 
86 Firestone v. First District Dental Socy., 59 Misc. 2d 862, 299 N.Y.S.2d 5!U 
(1969): Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., !l2!1 U.S. 192 (1944): Hale, 6 Lawyers 
Guild Ilev. at 681. 
8T BroWA v. Mitchell, 400 F.2d 598 (lOth Cir. 1969): Dorsey v. Stuyvesant 'town 
Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, 90 N.Y.S.2d 512(1949): Note 61 Han. L. llev. 
!l44, !l50 (1948). 
88 Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D.C., 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.c. 
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aid constitutes a contact with the state, but they do not agree as to 
what quantity of aid is sufficient to invoke state action. The case of 
Griffin v. State Board of Education,811 which represents a cautious 
view of the problem, found that the receipt of funds· from the state 
will not invoke state action unless those funds constitute a "prepon-
derance" of the budget of the institution.90 The Griffin court found 
that tuition grants to students who then paid the money over to os-
tensibly private schools evoked state action because the grants com-
posed the bulk of the income of the schools.lll The court suggested 
that if the grants had made up a smaller portion of the school income, 
state action would not have been found.1I2 
Relying on this dicta, the legislature of Louisiana limited its tuition 
grants to "applicants attending schools not 'predominately maintained' 
through state tuition grants:'118 The Louisiana attempt to save its 
tuition grant system by limiting the magnitude of the grants was un-
successful. The district court in Poindexter held that the preponder-
ance test of Griffin was not the true test, and that state action could 
be found if "significant" financial aid were shown.1I4 The court found 
that the Louisiana tuition grant system, which provided a smaller per-
centage of the total budget of the schools it aided than was present in 
Griffin, still provided significant aid and, therefore, found state ac-
tion.1I1I Thus, the degree of state involvement in the activity of the 
schools justified the finding of state action.1I6 
Poindexter relies on the case of Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hospital,1I7 which held that state funding of 17 percent of the 
cost of construction of a new wing of an existing private hospital 
brought all the activities of the hospital under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The court held that by accepting money from the state for fund-
ing a pomon of the cost of the new wing, the hospital had become 
1957): Norris v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md~ 1948): Lewis, The Meaning of 
State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 108S, 1108 (1960). 
811 2S9 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1964). 
90 Id •. at 565: see Comment, Developments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1056 et seq. 
(treatment of the Griffin case). 
91 Griffin v. State Board of Education, 239 F. Supp. 560, 565: and see, Powe v. 
Miles, 402 F.2d 7S (2d Cir. 1968): K.err v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 
(4th Cir. 1945). 
112 Griffin v. State Board of Education, 2S9 F. Supp. 560, 565 (E.n. Va. 1965). 
118 Poj,ndexter .v •. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commn., 275 F. Supp. 8SS, 8S6 (E.D. La. 1967). 
94 Id. at 854. "(D)ecisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private 
discrimination do not turn on whether the state aid adds up to 51 percent or adds 
up to only 49 percent of the support of the segregated institution~ The criterion 
is whether the state is 80 significantly involved in the private discrimination as 
to render the state action and the private action violative of the equal protection 
clause." 
IIIIId. at 857. 
116 Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, SO So. Cal. L. R:ev. 208 (1957). The theory set forth in this article 
is relative to that upon which Poindexter was decided, 
117 S2S F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, S76 U.s. 9S8 (1964). 
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an instrumentality of the state.os The court found that the hospital, 
by agreeing to build facilities with state money, had performed an 
obligation which the state owed the federal government in return for 
a federal grant under a hospital construction program.oo Perhaps the 
true basis of the decision was that the state should not be permitted 
to avoid the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
by giving federal money to private hospitals, which could practice 
segregation. If the state had constructed the facility itself, the consti-
tution would require integration. Simpkins might be distinguished 
from Poindexter on the ground that in Simpkins the state had an 
obligation which it chose to perform through a private institution. In 
Poindexter, the state had no obligation, although it did have a policy 
of encouraging segregation.loo 
The reasoning of both Poindexter and Simpkins relies on the case 
of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,101 in which the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that a restaurant which leased prem-
ises within a city-owned parking facility constituted sufficient contact 
with the state to invoke state action. The court held that the rents 
received under the lease were an integral part of the city plan to 
finance the facility.l02 The landlord-tenant relationship, in light of 
the city interest in obtaining rents, was held sufficient to "insinuate" 
the city into a position of "interdependence" with the restaurant.10s 
Such interdependence was held sufficient to bring the restaurant under 
the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
All these cases suggest a new test of state action in the concept of 
state policy manifested in encouragement of private individuals by 
the state. The finding of state control or extensive state participation 
may be greatly facilitated when the state encourages activities which 
it would not be permitted to engage in itself. 
It is possible that the rise of the "state encouragement" theory will 
affect the outcome of litigation brought by students against a private 
university. As the court said in Powe v. Miles: 
[T]he state must be involved not simply with some activity of 
the institution alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff 
but with the activity that caused the injury. Putting the point 
another way, the state action, not the private action, must be the 
subject of the complaint.l04 
08 Ibid. 
00 Ibid: Comment, Deveopments, 81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1059. 
100 Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Commn., 275 F. Supp. 855, 855, 
856 (E.D. La. 1967). 
101565 U.S. 715 (1961). 
102Id. at 719. 
103 Id. at 725: see, Statom v. Board of Commissioners of Prince George's County, 
255 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1965) (where public property was used by private boys 
club without fee, Burton was held to control). See also, Comment, Developments, 
81 Harv. L. Rev. at 1058. 
104407 F.2d at 81. 
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Thus, even if an institution like Boston University has received 
significant aid from the state, the foregoing language of Powe would 
probably preclude a finding of state action. The student would still 
be faced with the burden of showing that the Student Academic COn,. 
duct Committee's actions were influenced or encouraged by the state. 
The difficulty encountered by the student petitioner in Powe repre-
sents the problems involved in applying the logic of cases like Burton 
to private educational institutions. 
If the above interpretation is accurate, institutions which receive 
some state aid but not enough to support a finding of state action 
under Griffin may be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment if 
the effect of the state aid is to encourage or to involve the state in ac-
tivities prohibited to the state itself under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The theories of inherendy governmental function and state involve-
ment or encouragement broadened the concept of state action to in,. 
elude organizations which regarded themselves as within the private 
sector. Since many cases decided under these theories concern racial 
discrimination, the question remains open whether either theory will 
be extended to nondiscrimination cases and, in particular, whether 
either theory will control procedural due process cases. Recent cases 
concerning disciplinary action at tax-supported universities have shown 
that due process is being !Dore extensively applied to protect individ-
uals from arbitrary treatment by government agents than before. The 
Sturm court decided that persons deprived of due process by private 
institutions should in some cases be given as much protection by the 
courts as persons who suffer racial discrimination. In our era of ex-
panding concern for rights of the individual, other courts may come 
to agree with Sturm. 
ANTHONY ROBERTI 
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